Security Audit Report

Comprehensive security analysis for the DFBDelfos Oracle smart contract

Secure v1.0 December 22, 2025

Executive Summary

Overall Security Rating

✅ SECURE

The DFBDelfos oracle contract has undergone comprehensive security review including static analysis, unit testing, and property-based fuzz testing with Echidna.

27 Invariants Verified
5,000+ Fuzz Iterations
0 Critical Issues

Key Security Properties Verified

🔐

Access Control

  • Only BOT_ROLE can post prices
  • Only ADMIN_ROLE can upgrade
  • Only ADMIN_ROLE can pause/unpause
  • Only ADMIN_ROLE can manage roles
🛡️

Data Integrity

  • Round IDs always increment
  • Negative prices revert on getRate
  • Staleness checks enforced
  • Cannot reinitialize

Compatibility

  • Chainlink AggregatorV3 compatible
  • Balancer IRateProvider compliant
  • ERC2771 meta-transactions
  • UUPS upgradeable

Security Model

Layer 1 Role-Based Access Control
DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE
ADMIN_ROLE
BOT_ROLE
Layer 2 Pausability (Circuit Breaker)

Emergency pause blocks all price posting operations

Layer 3 UUPS Upgrade Protection

Only ADMIN_ROLE can authorize upgrades, implementation initializers disabled

Layer 4 Data Validation

Negative price protection, staleness enforcement, zero address checks

Echidna Fuzz Testing Results

27/27
Properties Passing
5,122
Total Calls
4,935
Unique Instructions
Category Invariant Status
Access Control echidna_attacker_cannot_post ✓ PASS
echidna_attacker_cannot_pause ✓ PASS
echidna_attacker_cannot_unpause ✓ PASS
echidna_attacker_cannot_grant_bot_role ✓ PASS
echidna_attacker_cannot_revoke_bot ✓ PASS
echidna_attacker_cannot_set_max_age ✓ PASS
echidna_attacker_cannot_upgrade ✓ PASS
echidna_only_admin_can_grant_bot ✓ PASS
echidna_forwarder_admin_only ✓ PASS
Pausability echidna_pause_blocks_posting ✓ PASS
Initialization echidna_cannot_reinitialize ✓ PASS
Round Data echidna_round_id_always_increments ✓ PASS
echidna_round_id_positive_after_post ✓ PASS
echidna_updated_at_not_future ✓ PASS
echidna_answered_in_round_equals_round_id ✓ PASS
Price Validation echidna_negative_price_reverts_getRate ✓ PASS
echidna_negative_price_reverts_latestAnswer1e18 ✓ PASS
echidna_positive_price_works ✓ PASS
Staleness echidna_getRate_reverts_if_stale ✓ PASS
echidna_getRateUnsafe_works_if_stale ✓ PASS
echidna_isfresh_no_data ✓ PASS
Immutability echidna_decimals_immutable ✓ PASS
echidna_description_immutable ✓ PASS
echidna_version_valid ✓ PASS
Bot Tracking echidna_bot_count_consistent ✓ PASS
echidna_bot_tracking_consistent ✓ PASS
Meta-Tx echidna_harness_not_forwarder ✓ PASS

Attack Vectors Analysis

❌ MITIGATED

Unauthorized Price Manipulation

Attacker tries to post fake prices without BOT_ROLE

Mitigation: onlyRole(BOT_ROLE) modifier on postPrice()
❌ MITIGATED

Malicious Upgrade Attack

Attacker tries to upgrade contract to malicious implementation

Mitigation: _authorizeUpgrade() requires ADMIN_ROLE
❌ MITIGATED

Reinitialization Attack

Attacker tries to reinitialize contract to take control

Mitigation: OpenZeppelin Initializable prevents re-init
❌ MITIGATED

Role Escalation Attack

Attacker tries to grant themselves BOT_ROLE or ADMIN_ROLE

Mitigation: Proper role hierarchy with ADMIN_ROLE as admin of BOT_ROLE
❌ MITIGATED

Stale Data Consumption

Consumer reads outdated price data

Mitigation: getRate() enforces staleness check with maxAge
⚠️ MINIMIZED

Bot Key Compromise

Attacker steals bot wallet private key

Impact Limited: Can only post prices, cannot upgrade/pause/configure. Admin can pause and revoke immediately.

Risk Summary

Risk Severity Mitigation Status
Unauthorized price posting Critical ✅ Fully mitigated
Malicious upgrade Critical ✅ Fully mitigated
Reinitialization attack Critical ✅ Fully mitigated
Role escalation High ✅ Fully mitigated
Stale data consumption Medium ✅ Fully mitigated
Negative price exploit Medium ✅ Fully mitigated
Bot key compromise Medium ⚠️ Risk minimized
Meta-tx spoofing Medium ✅ Fully mitigated

Contract Information

Contract Reviewed src/DFBDelfos.sol
Unit Tests test/DFBDelfos.t.sol
Fuzz Tests test/echidna/EchidnaDFBDelfosHarness.sol
Audit Date December 22, 2025
Auditor Internal Security Review

Balancer Integration

IRateProvider Compatible

This oracle implements the IRateProvider interface for direct integration with Balancer pools. The getRate() function returns the current price in 18-decimal format with staleness protection.

// Example: Using in Balancer pool configuration
address rateProvider = oracleAddress; // Your deployed DFBDelfos contract
uint256 rate = IRateProvider(rateProvider).getRate(); // Get current rate (18 decimals)